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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
§77-27-3, Utah Code Anno, and Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 1, are reproduced in the Addendum. 
INTRODUCTION 
A reading of the Brief filed by the Department of Corrections 
suggests that granting Mr. Neel fundamental rights in considering 
whether he should remain incarcerated would bring the Department of 
Corrections and the Utah Criminal Justice System to its knees. In 
fact, the Appellee's Brief is a conceptual overreaction to the 
simple and plain rights sought by Mr. Neel. 
It is not the purpose of this Reply Brief to rebut every point 
made by the Department of Corrections. Instead, some general 
themes of analysis emerge which show that the arguments made in the 
Brief of Appellees are misplaced and Mr. Neel should be allowed a 
fair parole proceeding in light of established constitutional 
principles. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Board of Pardons Fails 
to Show That Due Process Does Not Attach 
Mr. Neel argues in his principal Brief that under Utah's 
indeterminate sentencing system the Board of Pardons actually 
functions as the sentencing entity in a criminal proceeding. The 
State responds by stating, at page 10, that "appellant's bold 
assertions are contrary to all published opinions from the state 
and federal courts which have considered this specific issue under 
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Utah law." The State then follows with a lengthy citation of cases 
without explanation of the holdings and facts. 
A reading of all of the cases shows that none of them have 
considered the specific issue. Instead, the cases may be generally 
labeled as cases which deal with parole revocation proceedings. 
None of them address constitutional considerations in light of an 
indeterminate sentencing system. In fact, some of the cases 
support the proposition that due process rights exist in parole 
proceedings and the analysis of the case is an effort to identify 
exactly what rights exist. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
Neb. Penal & Cor., 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Board of Pardons v. Allen. 
482 U.S. 369 (1987). 
A reading of the cases cited on pages 10 and 11 of the Brief 
of Appellee shows that the federal courts hold there is no 
federally protected liberty interest in an expectation of parole. 
However, when the state creates an interest, as discussed in 
Greenholtz, the liberty interest may be deprived only by applying 
basic due process. Revocation hearings are, therefore, subject to 
fundamental due process rights under the federal Constitution. 
Morrissey v. Brewerf 408 U.S. 471 (1971). 
A close review of the facts of this case shows that Mr. Neel 
does not contest the general principles stated above, but that his 
circumstances fall in a different legal framework for analysis. 
Mr. Neel is not claiming in these proceedings that his parole was 
improperly revoked. What he claims is that he was, in effect, 
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sentenced under the Utah system without benefit of basic due 
process rights. 
The attempt of the Board of Pardons to dismiss its role in 
sentencing as nothing more than an administrative proceeding not in 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine of the Utah 
Constitution ignores the reality of what happens in the system. 
When a convicted person in Utah has a sentence pronounced upon him 
by the district court of five years to life, the accused has no 
idea after the judge has spoken how much time will be spent in 
prison. If one assumes a normal life span of approximately 
seventy-two years, the sentence is from five years to seventy-two 
years. The exact length of the sentence is not known until the 
Utah Board of Pardons has considered the case and set a parole 
date. 
This system is to be distinguished from the system in which a 
judge sets a definite term, such as ten years, and then a parole 
board is given the authority to reduce the time based on a variety 
of contingencies, including good behavior, evidence of rehabilita-
tion, etc. A review of §77-27-3, contained in the Addendum, shows 
that the Utah Board of Pardons "shall determine" when prisoners may 
be released or their sentences "terminated". This broad discretion 
makes the Board of Pardons the literal sentencing authority in Utah 
despite their disclaimer to the contrary. 
The responsive Brief of the Board of Pardons is, therefore, 
directed to the wrong question. Neel agrees that the federal cases 
say there is no protected liberty interests for due process 
3 
consideration when what is at issue is a discretionary parole. The 
Utah system does not fit these cases because of the indeterminate 
sentencing scheme. It is this difference that is specifically 
recognized in Foote v. Utah Bd. of PardonsP 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991). So long as it is actually sentencing that is being done by 
the Board of Pardons, some due process rights attach as explained 
in the principal Brief. The Board of Pardons fails to present 
convincing argument to the contrary. 
B. The Due Process Rights 
Claimed Do Not Unduly Burden the System 
The Board of Pardons spends an inordinate amount of space in 
its responsive Brief establishing that the federal courts have 
consistently held that there is not a protected liberty interest to 
which due process attaches in most parole proceedings. Again, Mr. 
Neel does not dispute the existence of that analysis, but reminds 
the court that what is at issue is a sentencing proceeding to 
which, as explained in the principal Brief, due process rights 
clearly attach. 
Mr. Neel shows in his principal Brief that when the Utah 
parole proceeding is properly labeled as a sentencing, certain 
federal rights attach because they are outside of the cases relied 
upon by the Board of Pardons. However, even if the analysis of the 
Board of Pardons concerning federal due process rights is accepted, 
a close reading of the responsive Brief shows that the existence of 
due process rights under the Utah Constitution is acknowledged. 
Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), discussed 
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in the principal Briefs of both parties, makes clear that rights 
exist at least under the Utah Constitution and really ends the 
discussion as to whether Mr. Neel has any rights. Instead, the 
discussion should be the scope of his rights. It is that point 
that the district court missed in this case. 
The district court should have considered the facts of the 
parole proceeding of Mr. Neel and considered evidence presented as 
to the scope of rights as contemplated by Foote. The attachments 
to the Brief of the Board of Pardons in which they present 
statistical analysis as to the burden of granting certain rights to 
inmates do not belong in an appellate brief. These extrinsic facts 
not in the record of this case are the kind of facts that should 
have been presented in a district court hearing or trial when the 
scope of due process applicable would be analyzed with the 
interests balanced. By including the substantial factual informa-
tion, including new proposed regulations, the State has, in effect, 
presented its side of what the scope of due process rights ought to 
be while arguing that Mr. Neel should not have the opportunity in 
the correct context of the district court to present his legal 
arguments as to the scope of due process. 
Yet another fundamental flawed theme of the Brief of the Board 
of Pardons is to further develop its resistance to the fundamental 
rights of attorney representation, the holding of evidentiary 
hearings, and access to the files of the Board of Pardons concern-
ing Mr. Neel. The opposing Brief responds in a broad and general 
manner beyond that of the facts presented by Mr. Neel. 
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It is ironic that the State argues, at page 30, that the 
current system promotes the "free flow of communication between the 
offender and the Board" when it is Mr. Neel that asks in this 
appeal that he be allowed to obtain information fundamental to the 
decision of why he remains an inmate. 
Similarly, at page 31, the Board of Pardons argues that Mr. 
Neel has a right under the applicable regulations to support his 
position "before, during and after the hearing". The problem with 
that argument is that Mr. Neel is not told the basis of the 
decision for him being denied parole so he has no way to effective-
ly apply the right to rebut. 
Finally, it is again ironic that the Board of Pardons resists 
the involvement of attorneys in the parole proceedings because it 
might bring delays to the Board consideration. The irony arises 
because Mr. Neel waited from February, 1991, when he had a 
rehearing date, until July 26, 1991, for his rehearing because the 
Department of Corrections was not able to complete an alienist 
report on time. See, Appellee's Brief, p. 7. Delays likely will 
be part of a revised system, but the degrese of the problem is 
speculation against deprivation of a basic right. 
The Board also resists application of the basic due process 
principle of confrontation of adverse witnesses. The Board 
suggests that cross-examination of victims will be detrimental not 
only to the victims but to the system as a whole* This argument 
ignores that Sixth Amendment confrontation can occur in far less 
dramatic ways. For example, in U.S. v. Reidr 911 F.2d 1456 (10th 
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Cir. 1990), a challenge was made to hearsay information considered 
in connection with the federal sentencing guidelines. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that cross-examination of adverse 
information in sentencing is not necessarily required. Instead, 
the sentencing court can use adverse information provided that the 
information is known to be reliable. The defendant, who has access 
to the information, may then present information to rebut that to 
be considered by the sentencing judge. 
Similarly, in U.S. v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1990), 
the court held that a defendant has a right in sentencing to 
challenge facts contained in a presentence report. The court found 
that the usual rules of evidence do not apply, but that the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment does apply and that the 
defendant should have an opportunity to rebut material information 
in dispute. 
As with these federal decisions, Mr. Neel does not necessarily 
need an opportunity to cross-examine the psychologist whose report 
has led to the denial of his release. The right of confrontation 
under either the federal or state Constitutions can still be met by 
simply making the psychological report available to him and giving 
him an opportunity, whether through use of his own testimony or 
information submitted to the Board by responding experts in his 
behalf, to rebut. 
A search of the principal Brief of Mr. Neel will show that he 
does not ask for the same formalities required for a full-fledged 
trial. Mr. Neel only asks that he be made aware of the information 
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which is being used to sentence him to a longer time in the prison, 
that he be allowed to respond to the information in some way, and 
that the presentation be made by an attorney of his choice. As 
explained in the principal Brief, these are the basic rights which 
attach to any sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the claimed parade of horrible things that will occur, 
this court will see, upon reflection, that Mr. Neel really does not 
ask for much. He was sentenced to an indeterminate time in prison 
and given a parole date for which he was found to substantively 
merit. He breached his parole agreement and was rightfully 
punished by revocation of the parole for the breach of that 
agreement. However, when he came to be considered for parole 
again, he was told he was substantively not worthy of release. He 
was given no explanation as to why the change had occurred in the 
Board decision. He does not dispute the power of the Board of 
Pardons to ultimately retain him. All he asks is that he be told 
why the Board changed its position, be allowed to respond to the 
reasons, and be allowed to make a presentation through an attorney. 
Put another way, under Utah's indeterminate sentencing system, 
he now sits in prison not knowing what he has done to be denied 
release, not knowing what he has to do to earn release, and not 
even knowing how long his sentence is except it may go as long as 
his life. 
Utah's Constitution guarantees in Article I, Section 1 that 
all men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend 
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their liberty. Mr. Neel does not have that right until he knows 
why he is held and is allowed to respond to it. This court should 
reverse the district court and order the Board of Pardons to hold 
a proceeding which allows for the confrontation of adverse 
information and a response thereto by a qualified attorney. 
DATED this U<» day of January, 1993. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGORY J*:^SANDERS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 3 , U . C . A . , Anno. 
77-27-3. Duties of board — Decisions final — Governor's power — 
Restitution as condition. (1) The board of pardons shall determine, by 
majority decision, when and under what conditions, subject to the provi-
sions of this chapter, persons now or hereafter serving sentences, in all 
cases except treason or impeachments, or as otherwise limited by law, may 
be released upon parole, pardoned, or have their fines or forfeitures 
remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. No fine or forfeiture 
shall be remitted, no parole, pardon or commutation granted or sentence 
terminated, except after a full hearing before the board in open session 
gnd after appropriate prior notice to the defendant of the time and place 
of the hearing has been given. The orders and decisions of the board of 
pardons and any dissent thereto shall be reduced to writing. 
(2) The determinations and decisions of the board of pardons in cases 
involving approval or denial of any action whatsoever, of paroles, pardons, 
commutations or terminations of sentence, or remission of fines and forfei-
tures shall be final. 
(3) Nothing herein shall be construed as a denial of or limitation on 
the governor's power to grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convic-
tions for offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on 
impeachment; however, such respites or reprieves shall not extend beyond 
the next session of the board of pardons and the board, at such session, 
shall continue or determine such respite or reprieve, or it may commute 
the punishment, or pardon the offense as herein provided. In the case of 
conviction for treason, the governor has the power to suspend execution 
of the sentence, until the case shall be reported to the legislature at its 
next session, when the legislature shall either pardon or commute the sen-
tence, or direct its execution. 
In determining when and where and under what conditions persons now 
or hereafter serving sentences may be released upon parole, pardoned or 
have their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or 
terminated, the state board of pardons shall consider whether such persons 
have made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accord-
ance with the standards and procedures of section 76-3-201, as a condition 
of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, commutation or ter-
mination of sentence. 
If the state board of pardons determines that restitution is inappropri-
ate, the state board of pardons shall state in writing as a part of the record 
of proceedings, the reasons for the decision. 
(4) Whenever the state board of pardons orders the release on parole 
of an inmate who has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to sec-
tion 76-3-201, but with respect to whom payment of all or a portion of the 
restitution was suspended until his release from imprisonment, the board 
may establish a schedule by which payment of the restitution may be 
resumed. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled inmate's per-
formance thereunder the board may consider the factors specified in sec-
tion 76-3-201 (3). The board may provide to the sentencing court a copy 
of the schedule and any modifications thereof. 
ADDENDUM B 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 1 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to eiyoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship accord-
ing to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against 
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
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